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OFF- BALANCE SIIEET ACTIVITY, MARKET- DETEIUrfINED AND
STOCK PRICES OF COMMERCIAL Bl~S

ACCOUNTING-DETE~~NED

ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of OBSA in recent years has concerned bank regulators that
such OBSA are risk-increasing and should be brought under control through
additional capital requirements. Previous empirical literature tested the
riskiness of certain OBSA by employing systematic or total risk as dependent
variables, and documented that some OBSA may reduce bank risk. This paper
reexamines the relationship between market values, accounting values of bank
stock and OBSA. This paper tests the implication of OBSA on market values of
bank equity by employing a generalized Gordon-type stock valuation model. The
results support the hypothesis that book values of equity predict market values
of bank stock siunificantly, and OBSA do not appear to influence market values
of bank stock. Because diversified investors are concerned with sYstematic risk
and hence market values of equities, additional capital requirements of OBSA may
be inappropriate.

1.

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between book

values, market values and off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) of commercial
banks of various sizes by employing a generalized Gordon-type stock valuation
model.
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic proliferation of
off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) and their risk-exposure.

Moreover, the

regulators have proposed that some OBSA be included in the calculation of a
risk-based capital requirement.
are risk-increasing.

The regulatory presumption is that such OBSA

Whether such contention is justified remains an open

question.
Bank regulators examine accounting information to determine the solvency of
a banking institution.

Empirical research generally supports the hypothesis

that accounting information is a surrogate of market information.

OBSA are not

summarized on the balance sheet but are instead given in the verbal footnotes to
balance sheets.

However, banks are required to report such activities to the

FDIC beginning 1984.

In off-balance sheet transactions, banks earn fee incomes

instead of interest spreads, and loans are not held on the books.
Two main effects of OBSA on risk, namely diversification and leverage
effects, have been rationalized in theoretical literature.

According to

diversification effects, banks engage in OBSA to diversify their asset
portfolios and achieve within-firm diversification.

The leverage effects of

OBSA imply that such activities augment potential leverage and hence increase
risk (Pavel [1987J, Benveniste and Berger [1986J).

Empirical literature tested

such diversification and leverage effects of OBSA by employing market risk
(beta) or total risk (variability of market equity return) as dependent
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variables and hence indirectly documented the impact of OBSA on market values of
bank equities (Hassan [1990] and Hassan [1991]).

This study tests directly the

premium or discount that OBSA imposes on market values of bank equities.
This research consists of five sections.

Section 2 discusses previous

literature on the relationship between accounting and market information, and
significance of this study.
discussed In Section 3.

The empirical methodology and hypotheses are

Section 4 analyzes data and presents empirical results.

A summary of the study's major conclusions and policy evaluations appears in
Section 5.
2.

Previous Research and Significance of this Study
The relationships between book and market values of bank stocks have been

documented across several dimensions.

Durand [1957] was one of the first to

examine the relationship between the market value and book value of bank stocks.
This study documented that the book value of the sample bank equities was the
most important determinant of their market price.
A pioneering study by Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970] examines the
relationships, using simple correlations, between a firm's market determined
beta and single indicators of financial policy.

They found significant

correlation between beta and dividend payout, financial leverage and an
"accounting" beta which measures the covariability of a firm's earnings with
earnings of all firms.

In addition, the study modeled the market beta as a

function of several accounting measures for the purpose of forecasting the
market beta.

They found that accounting data provided superior forecasts of the

market determined risk measure for the time period examined.
Pettway [1976] investigated the impact of banks' capital position on (1)
the risk premium of the bank's capital notes, (2) the bank's beta,

and~

(3) the
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price-earnings (PIE) ratio, during the 1971-74 perid.

His cross-sectional study

indicated that dividend yield, payout ratio and earnings

gro~{th

in explaining the variability of price-earnings ratios.

He also found no

are significant

apparent relationship between beta and these accounting variables for large
banks prior to 1974 and slightly significant inverse relationships after 1974.
A study by Beighley, Boyd and Jacobs [1979J examined the relationship
between financial leverage and stock price for 113 bank holding companies for
the periods 1972 through 1974.

By using a three month average of bank stock

price as the dependent variable, they found that dividends, earnings growth,
firm size and loan loss rate were the most important determinants of the market
prices of bank equities.

They also found that for the given sample of bank

holding companies, the higher a bank's degree of financial leverage at a point
in time, the lower is the bank's stock price, after controlling for bank size,
earnings growth, dividends and loan losses.
Jahankhani and Lynge [1980J investigated the relationship

bet~{een

financial

policies of commercial banks and two market-determined measures of risk.
Financial policies are proxied by average balance sheet and income statement
data over the period 1972-1976 for 95 commercial banks and bank holding
companies.

Accounting data measures of financial leverage, liquidity, dividend

payout ratio, loan loss experience and variability in earnings and deposits are
used.

These are related to a measure of systematic risk (beta) and total risk

(standard deviation of equity return) also calculated for the same five-year
period.

Bivariate and multivariate relationships are examined.

As independent

variables used to explain beta, the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio,
variability of deposits and the loan to deposit ratio are significant.

In

explaining total risk the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, a financial
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leverage measure, variability of deposits and earnings, a loan loss measure and
a liquidity measure are all significant.
Kamath [1980] examines the relationship between commercial bank stock
equity premium (or discount) and 16 variables representing the bank's
profitability, systematic and unsystematic risk, marketability, grmvth and
dividend policy.

The analysis suggests that four variables, namely, the return

on equity, the beta coefficient, the volume of stock trading and the gro\vth of
net asset value, statistically have the most influence upon the premium or
discount on bank stocks.

A seven variable multiple regression model Ivas able to

account for about 75% of the variability in the price to book ratio in each of
the years from 1974 to 1976.
None of these bank studies include OBSA as explanatory variables.

But

inclusion of OBSA in such accounting-based models can help analyze their impact
on the market values of bank equities.
Lynge and Lee [1987J used accounting-based risk-forecasting models to
investigate the impact of OBSA on both equity risk and systematic risk for large
commercial banks for the time period 1984-85 for a sample of 81 large banks.
The estimated coefficients of independent variables incorporating

anSA are

statistically significant in models explaining total risk but not significant In
models explaining systematic risk.
Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson [BKV, 1986] used a two- factor

CAP~I

model

that estimates systematic risk associated Ivith income, balance sheet and OBSA.
BI(1{ contend that OBSA is a proxy for overall bank quality and good management.
This explains why beneficiaries are willing to hold the contingent claims that
banks issue.

Further, they find that certain forms of OBSA (standby letters of

credit) actually decrease the risk of diversified bank shareholders due to the

market discipline that the guarantee beneficiaries impose on bank management.
Finally, the results of BK1Y indicate that loan commitments and commercial
letters of credit are not priced in the equity market.

Thus their issuance did

not appear to increase the risk of the bank.
~Iost

recently, Unal and Kane [1987J used a statistical market value

accounting model

(S~WAM)

to explain the market values of bank equities into

market values of its recorded and unrecorded net assets.

An adjustment factor

is used to estimate the net market value of on-balance items.

The unrecorded

. equities, defined as the difference betveen unbooked assets and liabilities, is
termed as "off-balance sheet items."

By regressing market values of bank

equities on book values of their net worth, Unal and Kane found that large banks
show a market premium over book equity prior to 1980, but rarely thereafter.
~Iedium

banks show a market discount over book equity until 1983 and small banks

until 1985.

They also show the market value of unrecorded equity to be

significantly negative prior to 1980 (across bank size) but insignificant
thereafter.
Although Unal and Kane [1987J explained deposit-insurance guarantees as an
unrecorded component of equity, they did not explicitly consider
deposit-insurance subsidies in regression analysis.

However, they mentioned the

possibility of specification problem in their analysis.

By introducing OBSA In

regression analysis, this paper seeks to recify such problem.
The empirical literature, to date, has failed to account for the effects of
OBSA on the market values of bank equities.

It is \;ell-documented in literature

that accounting values contain significant predictive power from which to
ascertain market values.

This study will report on tvo tests.

First, this

study will investigate the effects of anSA on market values of bank equities by
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employing a generalized Gordon-type model that includes, in addition to OBSA,
several accounting variables used in past empirical research.
research will focus on the association
bank equities.

bet,~een

Second, this

book values and market values of

From these tests, it can be empirically determined whether

overall OBSA has acted as a deflator or inflator for market values of equities.
Only if OBSA acts as a deflator can federal regulators seemingly assume that
this portion of bank activities is in need of additional regulation (presumably
in the form of risk-based capital guidelines).

If, on the other hand, overall

OBSA activity acts as an inflator of bank market value, regulators should
reconsider the potentially adverse effects of increased capital requirements on
the chosen risk-stance of the bank.

If OBSA are insignificantly correlated ,.ith

market values of equities, it can also be ascertained that well-diversified
investors do not price such OBSA and, therefore, proposed capital requirements
of OBSA may be inappropriate.
3.

Methodology and Hypotheses
The standard constant dividend growth model (commonly referred to as the

Gordon Model) provides the framework for this analysis:

(1)

where:
Po
Do
g
k

=
=
=
=

current price,
current dividend per share,
expected growth of dividends, Md
appropriate discount rate.

Equation (1) implies that the price of the common stock is a function of
three basic factors:

the expected cash dividend, expected growth rate of the
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dividend stream, and the required rate of return corresponding to the firm's
risk class.
Po is the equilibrium stock price.

Trading will occur only to the extent

that investors hold divergent beliefs about k and g and the equilibrium price
will change only as events alter the market's perception of k and g.
As the pricing factors in equation (1) are not directly observable, proxy
variables for k and g must be developed as surrogates.

Because proxy measures

are used, it cannot be expected that the specific functional form of the
equations will be maintained.

A more general form can be adopted for empirical

purposes:
Po

= f(d o '

~o

oa-o > 0,

g', k'), where:

~o

0k7 <

°and

~o
~

(2)

> 0.

0

For purposes of convenience In empirical testing, the relationship can be
assumed to be linear.

The signs of partial derivatives are those that are

expected, based on equation (2) and assuming

that~k'

and g' are good proxy

measures.
The following generalized Gordon-type model will be used to test the effect
of OBSA On market value of equity:
?

Pm

= f(OBSA,

+

+

Pb , lev, payout, p,

~re'

lnloss).

(3)

where
Pm

= market

value of bank share X number of shares;

onSA = ag~regate of reported contingent liabilities from all forms of

OB~A except interest rate s\{aps. This aggregate is deflated by
the total book value of assets in an attempt to avoiJ potential
heteroskedasticity;
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Pb

= book

value of equity per share X number of shares;

= book value ratio of liabilities to assets;
Payout = ratio of dividend per share to ernings per share;
P = accounting determined bank beta;
~re = standard deviation of return on book equity;
lev

Inloss

= provision

for loan losses.

The expected partial derivatives are shown above each variable in equation (3).
All right-hand variables except DBSA in equation (3) are balance-sheet
variables.

These variables are developed to capture the three fundamental

factors embodied in equation (2).
Two main effects of DBSA on risk and hence on market value of equity:
namely diversification and leverage effects, are rationalized in theoretical
literature.

Diversification effects are expected to increase equity values

while leverage effects to decrease equity values.

However, a priori, it is

difficult to say which effect dominates.
Pb is expected to be positively related to Pm because there is sufficient
evidence in empirical literature that book values of equity predict market
values of equity reasonably well.
The "lnloss represents the probability of future defaults that may be
expected to reduce earnings and dividend.

Therefore, Inloss will affect Pm

negatively.
Dividend stabilization policy implies that firms are reluctant to change
dividends drastically, and, in particular to cut dividends once a certain level
has been established.

Therefore, high dividend payouts are associated with low

risk and hence high market values of equities.
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Banks use a high degree of financial leverage.

Because a higher degree of

leverage increases financial risk, lev is inversely related to market values of
equity.
Standard deviation of
measure.
equities.

bo~k

equity return

(~re)

is an accounting-risk

Rapid growth identifies with high risk and low market values of
Similarly, accounting beta (fi) is a good surrogate of market beta.

high accounting beta translates into a higher return by stockholders and lower
market values of equities.
A pooled cross-section and time-series econometric technique is used to
test the following two hypotheses:

4.

Hypotheses one:

H :

o
Hi:

OBSA does not significantly affect Pm
OBSA does significantly affect Pm

Hypothesis two:

H :

Pb is not significant in determining Pm
Pb is significant in determining Pm

o
Hi:

Data Analysis and Empirical Results
4.1 Data Analysis
The Compustat Data Tapes were used to obtain the observed values of Pm'

payout, and the net income and average total asset amounts used in calculating
the accounting beta.
Compustat.

Return on average equity was also calculated from

The standard deviation of return on average equity is based on six

annual observations between 1983 and 1988.

Because accounting returns are

deflated by a market index, accounting betas are actually a hybrid.

The CRSP

Equally-Veighted index was selected and annualized for use as the market index.
Karels and Sackley [1991J show that accounting betas calculated with this index
provide a more positive correlation with market-determined betas than other

A
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accounting-derived or market-derived indices.

An accounting beta Has calculated

for each bank using 11 annual observations from 1977 through 1988.
All remaining data items were obtained from the FDIC Data Tapes containing
the Call and Income Reports.

The leverage variable was calculated as the

difference between the value one and the equity/asset ratio, defined by total
assets.

The OBSA variable is a composite of the 18 reported figures comprising

Schedule RC-L (Commitments and Contingencies).
4.2

Empirical Results

Descriptive statistics of the regression variables are presented in
Table 1.

Table 2 presents correlations among all independent variables and

dependent variables used in regression analysis.

Book values of equities (P b)
show positive association and variability of book equity return (~re) shol's

negative association with market values of equities at the 5% significance
level.

The remaining variables, except payout, exhibit expected signs but are

not significant at the 5% level.

These bivariate relationships provide credence

to the explanatory power of independent accounting risk measures to predict
market values of bank equities.
The independent accounting risk variables, in general, are not highly
correlated with one another, indicating that multicolinearity is not a serious
problem .. However, variability of book equity return ShOH positive correlations
with both 'leverage (lev) and accounting betas (fi).

These results are not

surprising since leverage (lev) increases equity variance and leverage
influences accounting betas.

Loan-loss provision (lnloss) variable shol's

negative correlation with dividend payout (payout), indicating that high loan
losses are associated with 10Her dividend payouts, all other things being the
same.
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Table 3 presents pooled cross-section and time-series results of empirical
model (3).

All explanatory variables except lnloss have expected signs.

Book

values of equity (P b) act a premium over market values of equity and is
significant at the 1% level. OBSA shows neither premium or discount over market
values of equity and is insignificant.

Leverage (lev) and accounting beta (fi)

discounts market equity values and are statistically significant.
dividend payout (payout) and variability of book equity return

',nile

(~re)

retain

their expected signs but these are not statistically significant.
Loan loss reserve (lnloss) has the perverse coefficient and is significant.
One possible explanation for this result is that investors may actually have a
preference for banks which exhibit aggressiveness in their lending practices,
despite its short-term detrimental effects.
The results of this research are consistent \vith those of others.

Like

Kamath [1980J and Pettway [1976J, book-values of equities (P b) , leverage ratio
(lev), dividend payout (payout) and beta (fi) are significant in explaining
market values of equities.

However, this research improves upon the existing

empirical literature by including off-balance sheet contingent items (OBSA) and
empirically examining the impact of OBSA on market values of bank equities.
The results compare favorably \vith those of Unal and Kane [1987J.
Off- balance sheet activities (OBSA) shmv insignificant relationship with market
value of equities.

This study is an improvement over Unal and Kane, at least

technically, because while Unal and Kane mention off-balance sheet items but do
not explicitly analyze their impact, this research includes OBSA in regression
results.

However, this paper and Unal and Kane arrive at the same conclusion

that OBSA activities are not significant predictors of market values of bank
stocks across all sizes after 1980s.
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5.

Summary and Conclusions
The primary purpose of this paper has been to examine the influence of

off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) on market values of bank stocks.

By

applying a pooled cross-section and time-series econometric technique to
estimate a generalized Gordon-type model of bank stock valuation, it appears
that OBSA does not affect market values of equities and book values of equity
are significant predictors of market values of bank equities.

However,

accounting risk variables such as book values of equity, leverage ratio,
accounting beta and loan loss provision appear to be significant predictors of
bank stock valuation.

A pooled cross-section time-series is employed so that

intertemporal movements and interbank difference can be considered
simultaneously and the data base can also be extended.

Such technique is of

particular interest to this research because cross-section or time-series data
alone (16 cross-section and 6 time-perios) do not yield sufficient degrees of
freedom in regression analysis.
Due to a well-established relatinship between book and market-determined
bank stock values, the regulatory proposal to control OBSA through risk-based
capital requirements may be inappropriate.

The results show that OnSA, in

general, are insignificant predictors of market values of equities.
such OBSA are not a concern for diversified investors.

Therefore,

There is some evidence

that certain widely-issued forms of contingent liabilities do not increase but
actually decrease the riskiness of individual banks.

The current findings, in

addition to past evidence, imply that regulatory interference of OBSA in the
form of additional capital requirements may create distortions in banking
off-balance sheet capital market.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION
VARIABLE

MEAN

ST. DEV.

MIN.

MAX.

P~l

362.1

262.06

60.86

17782.9

OBSA

.16963

.12590

.0081

.7322

Pb2

314.68

237.12

124.53

1503.5

lev

.93298

.013583

.899

.961

Payout

.17536

1.1825

- 11. 0

1.451

/3

.00085419

.006149

- .005492

.01508

lJ're

.043412

.029169

.012

.1096

lnloss 3

5381. 6

7726.5

67.0

44623.0

1, 2
3

in $ millions.
in $ thousands.

TAilLE 2
CORRELATION MATRIX OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIAilLES
Pm

OilSA

1.0000
- 0 .1085

1.0000

P
b

0.9369

- 0.1395

1.0000

lev

- 0.0837

- 0.0782

0.0421

1.0000

payout

-0.0092

- 0 .1806

-0.0147

- 0.0767

1.0000

(J

- 0.1135

0.0086

0.0207

0.1941

0.0129

1.0000

(Tre

- 0 .4304

- 0.0738

- 0.3393

0.3251

-0.1285

0.63085

1.0000

lnloss

- 0.0786

- 0.0786

- 0.1206

- 0.0309

- 0.4399

0.01308

0.1053

1.000

Ph

lev

payout

(J

(Tre

lnloss

Pm

OilSA

TABLE 3
POOLED CROSS SECTION TIME SERIES REGRESSION RESULTS
COEFFICIENT

VARIABLE

t-RATIO

Constant

1544.4

3.512

***

Pb

1.0554

21. 524

***

-1625.1

- 3.4369

***

lev
payout

5.1944

0.99745

fJ

-5428.0

-4.2545

iJ're

- 250.55

- 0.75971

lnloss

0.0016477

1. 9722

OBSA

40.883

1.0469

BUSE
SSE
F

2
R

88 D.F.

.8621
94.048
78.606

Signif icance:
** 57.
*** 17.

***

**

TABLE 4
LIST OF SAMPLE llANKS
1.

Baybanks Inc.

2.

Central Fidelity Banks Inc.

3.

Colorado National Bankshares

4.

Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc.

5.

Dauphin Deposit Corp.

6.

First Alabama Bancshares Inc.

7.

First Florida Banks Inc.

8.

First of America Bank Corp.

9.

First Virginia Banks Inc.

10.

Mercantile Bancorporation

11.

Mercantile Bankshares Corp.

12.

NBD Bancorp

13.

Sunwest Financial Services Inc.

14.

Trustcorp

15 .

United j[issouri Bankshares

16.

Zions Bancorporation

